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## 2AC Hegemony Good/Sustainable

### Bam, in the face

Robert Knowles (Assistant Professor – New York University School of Law) 2009 “American hegemony and the foreign affairs constitution” Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 41 Lexis

American unipolarity is unprecedented.324 First, the United States is geographically isolated from other potential rivals, who are located near one another in Eurasia.325 This mutes the security threat that the U.S. seems to pose, while increasing the threats that potential rivals seem to pose to one another.326 Second, the U.S. far exceeds the capabilities of all other states in every aspect of power—military, economic, technological, and in terms of what is known as “soft power.” This advantage “is larger now than any analogous gap in the history of the modern state system.”327 Third, unipolarity is entrenched as the status quo for the first time since the 17th Century, multiplying free rider problems for potential rivals and rendering less relevant all modern previous experience with balancing.328 Finally, the potential rivals’ possession of nuclear weapons makes the concentration of power in the United States appear less threatening. A war between great powers in today’s world is very unlikely.329 These factors make the current system much more stable, peaceful and durable than the past multi-polar and bipolar systems in which the United States operated for all of its history until 1991. The lack of balancing means that the United States faces weak structural pressure.330 The internal processes of the U.S. matter now more than any other nations’ have in history.331 As one realist scholar has argued, the U.S. can best ensure the stability of this unipolar order by ensuring that its predominance appears legitimate.332 *Hegemonic* orders take on hierarchical characteristics, with the preeminent power having denser political ties with other nations than in a unipolar order.333 Stability in hegemonic orders is maintained in part through security guarantees and trade relationships that result in economic specialization among nations.334 For example, if Nation X’s security is supplied by Hegemon Y, Nation X can de-emphasize military power and focus on economic power. In a hegemonic system, the preeminent state has “the power to shape the rules of international politics according to its own interests.”335 The hegemon, in return, provides public goods for the system as a whole.336 The hegemon possesses not only superior command of military and economic resources but “soft” power, the ability to guide other states’ preferences and interests.337 The durability and stability of hegemonic orders depends on other states’ acceptance of the hegemon’s role. The hegemon’s leadership must be seen as legitimate.338 The United States qualifies as a global hegemon. In many ways, the U.S. acts as a world government.339 It provides public goods for the world, such as security guarantees, the protection of sea lanes, and support for open markets.340 After World War II, the U.S. forged a system of military alliances and transnational economic and political institutions such as the United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank that remain in place today. The U.S. provides security for allies such as Germany and Japan, maintaining a strong military presence in Asia and Europe.341 Because of its overwhelming military might, the U.S. possesses other nations from launching wars that would tend to be truly de-stabilizing. Similarly, the United States provides a public good through its efforts to combat terrorism and confront—even through regime change—rogue states.343 The United States also provides a public good through its promulgation and enforcement of international norms. It exercises a dominant influence on the definition of international law because it is the largest “consumer” of such law and the only nation capable of enforcing it on a global scale.344 The U.S. “was the primary driver behind the establishment of the United Nations system and the development of contemporary treaties and institutional regimes to effectuate those treaties in both public and private international law.”345 Moreover, controlling international norms are sometimes embodied in the U.S. Constitution and domestic law rather than in treaties or customary international law. For example, whether terrorist threats will be countered effectively depends “in large part on U.S. law regarding armed conflict, from rules that define the circumstances under which the President can use force to those that define the proper treatment of enemy combatants.”346 These public goods provided by the United States stabilize the system by legitimizing it and decreasing resistance to it. The transnational political and economic institutions created by the United States provide other countries with informal access to policymaking and tend to reduce resistance to American hegemony, encouraging others to “bandwagon” with the U.S. rather than seek to create alternative centers of power.347 American hegemony also coincided with the rise of globalization—the increasing integration and standardization of markets and cultures—which tends to stabilize the global system and reduce conflict.348 The legitimacy of American hegemony is strengthened and sustained by the democratic and accessible nature of the U.S. government. The American constitutional separation of powers is an international public good. The risk that it will hinder the ability of the U.S. to act swiftly, coherently or decisively in foreign affairs is counter-balanced by the benefits it provides in permitting foreigners multiple points of access to the government.349 Foreign nations and citizens lobby Congress and executive branch agencies in the State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce Departments, where foreign policy is made.350 They use the media to broadcast their point of view in an effort to influence the opinion of decision-makers.351 Because the United States is a nation of immigrants, many American citizens have a specific interest in the fates of particular countries and form “ethnic lobbies” for the purpose of affecting foreign policy.352 The courts, too, are accessible to foreign nations and non-citizens. The Alien Tort Statute is emerging as an important vehicle for adjudicating tort claims among non-citizens in U.S. courts.353

## Hegemony Good (Kagan)

### Strong US power projection is a critical check on the escalation of conflict

Kagan 2011 The Price of Power The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs Jan 24, 2011, Vol. 16, No. 18 • By ROBERT KAGAN Robert Kagan is a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution.

Today the international situation is also one of high risk. • The terrorists who would like to kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase the chances they will succeed. • American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons. • In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too, nations in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have to decide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear weapons to resist it. In the 1990s, after the Soviet Union had collapsed and the biggest problem in the world seemed to be ethnic conflict in the Balkans, it was at least plausible to talk about cutting back on American military capabilities. In the present, increasingly dangerous international environment, in which terrorism and great power rivalry vie as the greatest threat to American security and interests, cutting military capacities is simply reckless. Would we increase the risk of strategic failure in an already risky world, despite the near irrelevance of the defense budget to American fiscal health, just so we could tell American voters that their military had suffered its “fair share” of the pain? The nature of the risk becomes plain when one considers the nature of the cuts that would have to be made to have even a marginal effect on the U.S. fiscal crisis. Many are under the illusion, for instance, that if the United States simply withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and didn’t intervene anywhere else for a while, this would have a significant impact on future deficits. But, in fact, projections of future massive deficits already assume the winding down of these interventions.Withdrawal from the two wars would scarcely make a dent in the fiscal crisis. Nor can meaningful reductions be achieved by cutting back on waste at the Pentagon—which Secretary of Defense Gates has already begun to do and which has also been factored into deficit projections. If the United States withdrew from Iran and Afghanistan tomorrow, cut all the waste Gates can find, and even eliminated a few weapons programs—all this together would still not produce a 10 percent decrease in overall defense spending. In fact, the only way to get significant savings from the defense budget—and by “significant,” we are still talking about a tiny fraction of the cuts needed to bring down future deficits—is to cut force structure: fewer troops on the ground; fewer airplanes in the skies; fewer ships in the water; fewer soldiers, pilots, and sailors to feed and clothe and provide benefits for. To cut the size of the force, however, requires reducing or eliminating the missions those forces have been performing. Of course, there are any number of think tank experts who insist U.S. forces can be cut by a quarter or third or even by half and still perform those missions. But this is snake oil. Over the past two decades, the force has already been cut by a third. Yet no administration has reduced the missions that the larger force structures of the past were designed to meet. To fulfill existing security commitments, to remain the “world’s power balancer of choice,” as Leslie Gelb puts it, to act as “the only regional balancer against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe, and Iran in the Middle East” requires at least the current force structure, and almost certainly more than current force levels. Those who recommend doing the same with less are only proposing a policy of insufficiency, where the United States makes commitments it cannot meet except at high risk of failure. The only way to find substantial savings in the defense budget, therefore, is to change American strategy fundamentally. The Simpson-Bowles commission suggests as much, by calling for a reexamination of America’s “21st century role,” although it doesn’t begin to define what that new role might be. Others have. For decades “realist” analysts have called for a strategy of “offshore balancing.” Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed “passing the mantle of regional stabilizer” to a consortium of “Russia, China, Iran, and India.” In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability. Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly “stabilize” the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan’s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most dreadful wars in human history. It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build “situations of strength” (Acheson’s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a “preponderance of power,” and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach. From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman’s containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of “imperial overstretch,” arguing that American decline was inevitable “if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]” were allowed to continue at the same time as “massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.” Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of major war, the support of an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked at coldly, simply in terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs. The danger, as always, is that we don’t even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible, that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the “end of history.” It is always tempting to believe that the international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power**,** or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table and the table will not fall over.

## Hegemony Good (Gray)

### And, Nuclear Conflict

Gray, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, and founded of the National Institute for Public Policy, 2K4 (Colin, “The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order”, pg. 10)

The United States could pick up its military ball and go home. It could choose to rely for world order on the hidden hand of universal commercial self-interest somewhat guided by such regional and local balances and imbalances of power as may be extant or might emerge. In effect, frequently this would translate as a green light for regional bullies to mark out their territories (and sea space and air space). Thus far, the contemporary United States is showing no persuasive evidence of an inclination to bring itself home as a political military influence. The issue is not whether America’s skills in statescraft are fully adequate for the sheriff role (whose would be?). Rather, it is whether there is to be a sheriff at all. If the United States declines the honor, or takes early retirement, there is no deputy sheriff, waiting, trained and ready for promotion. Furthermore, there is no world-ordering mechanism worthy of the name which could substitute for the authority and strength of the American Superpower. At present there is no central axis of a balance of power to keep order, while the regional balances in the Middle East and South and East Asia are as likely to provoke as to cool conflict – and conflict with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at that.

## Hegemony Good – Conflict Escalatino

### American’s will still demand an assertive roll – but we’ll lack the tools needed to back-up our rhetoric and prevent war

PhD Schmitt, resident scholar and director of strategic studies at AEI, earned PhD at the University of Chicago, former professor at Johns Hopkins University, former Fellow at the Brookings Institution, 6-22- ‘7 (Gary J., “To Be, or Not to Be . . . an Empire,” American Enterprise Institute, National Security Outlook, Short Publications)

Thayer opens the book with his case for American primacy, arguing that America is indeed an empire, but not a traditional one: its influence is now mostly tied to the indirect sway and security provided by its military power, its economic muscle, and the soft power associated with its political ideals and dominant global cultural presence. Moreover, the spirit behind America's empire is the "spirit of 1776." From the get-go, Americans wanted to expand geographically, and--equally important--they saw their notions of political and economic freedom as "a light to the nations." In its bones, America has never been a status quo power. That Thayer and Layne both admit the United States is not an empire in the traditional sense seems to suggest that the country is not, in fact, an empire. But even if America has a hegemonic instinct, Thayer reasonably asks whether the country can carry it out. Can the United States retain its primacy, or will other powers, as most realists believe, react to such overwhelming power by challenging it? Of the available candidates for doing so--China, Europe, and radical Islam--only China presents a significant problem, according to Thayer. Europe is dying away; terrorism is a bloody but manageable nuisance. Thayer even doubts China's long-term prospects, given its own internal problems related to its demographics, corruption, fragile financial system, income inequality, environmental pollution, and so on. Even if the United States can maintain global hegemony, should it? Absent another realistic alternative to keep peace and stability in the world, Thayer argues, it remains in America's interest to play the role of hegemon. It might not make us loved, but the general stability provided by the American security umbrella of alliances and military power has made the world much more peaceful than it would otherwise be. By standards both economic and humane, Thayer says, that is a good return on the U.S. investment. Layne's argument is that there is, in fact, a realist alternative to the endless pursuit of primacy: a strategy of "offshore balancing" that amounts to a quasi-isolationist policy of selective diplomatic and military engagement. Indeed, the "offensive" realist argument for primacy rests, Layne suggests, on paying too much attention to the lessons supposedly learned from the security problems and strategies for dealing with them that arose from centuries of competition among the powers of continental Europe. Given America's geography and weak neighbors, the security model far more relevant to our situation is the one adopted by maritime Britain: a small army, a big fleet, and a willingness to find new allies quickly and dump old ones when necessary. Today's primacy advocates couple it with a policy of democracy promotion, believing that the world is safer when there are more democracies, not fewer--a thesis Layne calls the most "over-hyped and under-supported 'theory' ever to be concocted by American academics."[3] According to Layne, the advantage of his alternative grand strategy is that it avoids stimulating great power rivalries, eliminates the economically disastrous consequences of "imperial overstretch," and precludes the necessity of a "national security state" in which our rights and civic culture are put at risk. Finally, it avoids the messes of democracy promotion and nation-building (e.g., Somalia and Iraq). Problems and Prospects International security specialists will quibble that Thayer's and Layne's two grand strategies are not the sum total of strategies available to the "American empire." Nor will they be satisfied with the authors' loose use of the term "empire." That Thayer and Layne both admit the United States is not an empire in the traditional sense seems to suggest that the country is not, in fact, an empire. Hegemony and empire are not one and the same, although their attributes can at times overlap. That said, the book provides plenty of fodder for debate and thought. Its biggest problem, however, lies in Layne's dyspeptic analysis of current policy opponents. Rather than taking the opposing argument as seriously as Thayer takes his, Layne resorts to unsubstantiated claims about "neocons," White House lies, and cabals (the "Blue Team") trying to foment a "preventive" war with China.[4] Similarly, his dismissal of the democratic peace theory is equally over-the-top. Even if one thinks that the theory is at times oversold, to claim that it has absolutely no merit leaves readers with the sense that there is as much anger as argument in Layne's case. An additional problem, perhaps tied to the way the book is structured, is that Layne spends the majority of his time criticizing the argument for primacy without giving the reader much of a handle on the particulars of his own preferred strategy. As a result, we do not know whether his model of "offshore balancing" is more British in style--that is, fairly active in playing the decisive power broker among the other competing states--or more passive in content, such as the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. If the former, a key problem with the strategy is that it requires a far more calculating style of statecraft than the United States has ever had. And even if we had Henry Kissinger upon Henry Kissinger to carry it out, would the American people really let their government play this particular game of international politics, shifting partners based on power relations rather than on the character of the states themselves? The disappearance of the United States as a security guarantor is likely to lead to more competition among states and to the creation of a more chaotic and fluid international environment. Britain had a hard enough time playing this role in its day, finding itself in numerous conflicts regardless. If the latter, the passive offshore balancing approach leads to the question of whether such a strategy results in putting off a security challenge until it may be far more difficult to deal with. Layne's bet, at least in the case of Iran and China today, is that if the United States would only get out of the way, other powers would naturally begin to meet the challenge. It is possible, but doing so might create even more destabilizing competition among other regional powers or lead those same powers to acquiesce to China or Iran's new hegemony, fueling their ambitions rather than lessening them. The history of international relations suggests that most great crises result from neglecting to address more minor ones early on. As Thayer argues, it is probably less costly to nip these threats in the bud to than wait for them to become full-blown security crises.

## Hegemony Good – Terrorism

### Terrorist plots are inevitable – Hegemony prevents attacks from going nuclear

Kagan, Carnegie, ‘7 (Robert, July 19, “End of Dreams, Return of History” Real Clear Politics, <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/>end\_of\_dreams\_ return\_of\_histor.html)

The Islamists' struggle against the powerful and often impersonal forces of modernization, capitalism, and globalization is another significant fact of life in the world today. Much of this fight has been peaceful, but some of it has been violent and now, oddly, poses by far the greatest threat of a catastrophic attack on the mainland of the United States. It is odd because the struggle between modernization and globalization, on the one hand, and traditionalism, on the other, is largely a sideshow on the international stage. The future is more likely to be dominated by the struggle among the great powers and between the great ideologies of liberalism and autocracy than by the effort of some radical Islamists to restore an imagined past of piety. But of course that struggle has taken on a new and frightening dimension. Normally, when old and less technologically advanced civilizations have confronted more advanced civilizations, their inadequate weapons have reflected their backwardness. Today, the radical proponents of Islamic traditionalism, though they abhor the modern world, are nevertheless not only using the ancient methods of assassination and suicidal attacks, but also have deployed the weapons of the modern world against it. Modernization and globalization inflamed their rebellion and also armed them for the fight. It is a lonely and ultimately desperate fight, for in the struggle between tradition and modernization, tradition cannot win -- though traditional forces armed with modern technology can put up a good fight. All the world's rich and powerful nations have more or less embraced the economic, technological, and even social aspects of modernization and globalization. All have embraced, albeit with varying degrees of complaint and resistance, the free flow of goods, finances, and services, and the intermingling of cultures and lifestyles that characterize the modern world. Increasingly, their people watch the same television shows, listen to the same music, and go to the same movies. And along with this dominant modern culture they have accepted, even as they may also deplore, the essential characteristics of a modern morality and aesthetics: the sexual as well as political and economic liberation of women, the weakening of church authority and the strengthening of secularism, the existence of what used to be called the counterculture, free expression in the arts (if not in politics), which includes the freedom to commit blasphemy and to lampoon symbols of faith, authority, and morality -- these and all the countless effects of liberalism and capitalism unleashed and unchecked by the constraining hand of tradition, a powerful church, or a moralistic and domineering government. The Chinese have learned that while it is possible to have capitalism without political liberalization, it is much harder to have capitalism without cultural liberalization. Today radical Islamists are the last holdout against these powerful forces of globalization and modernization. They seek to carve out a part of the world where they can be left alone, shielded from what they regard as the soul-destroying licentiousness of unchecked liberalism and capitalism. The tragedy for them is that their goal is impossible to achieve. Neither the United States nor the other great powers will turn over control of the Middle East to these fundamentalist forces, if only because the region is of such vital strategic importance to the rest of the world. The outside powers have strong internal allies as well, including the majority of the populations of the Middle East who have been willing and even eager to make peace with modernity. Nor is it conceivable in this modern world that a people can wall themselves off from modernity even if the majority wanted to. Could the great Islamic theocracy that al Qaeda and others hope to erect ever completely block out the sights and sounds of the rest of the world and thereby shield their people from the temptations of modernity? The mullahs have not even succeeded at doing that in Iran. The project is fantastic. The world is thus faced with the prospect of a protracted struggle in which the goals of the extreme Islamists can never be satisfied because neither the United States nor anyone else has the ability to give them what they want. The West is quite simply not capable of retreating as far as the Islamic extremists require. If retreat is impossible, perhaps the best course is to advance. Of the many bad options in confronting this immensely dangerous problem, the best may be to hasten the process of modernization in the Islamic world: more modernization, more globalization, faster. This would require greater efforts to support and expand capitalism and the free market in Arab countries, as many have already recommended, as well as efforts to increase public access to the modern world through television and the internet. Nor should it be considered a setback if these modern communication tools are also used to organize radical extremism. That is unavoidable so long as the radical Islamist backlash persists, which it will for some time. Finally, the liberal world should continue to promote political modernization and liberalization; support human rights, including the rights of women; and use its influence to support repeated elections that may, if nothing else, continually shift power from the few to the many. This, too, will produce setbacks. It will provide a channel for popular resentments to express themselves and for radical Islamism itself to take power. But perhaps this phase is as unavoidable as the present conflict. Perhaps the sooner it is begun, the sooner a new phase can take its place. 21 Throughout all these efforts, whose success is by no means guaranteed and certainly not any time soon, the United States and others will have to persist in fighting what is, in fact, quite accurately called "the war on terrorism." Now and probably for the coming decades, organized terrorist groups will seek to strike at the United States, and at modernity itself, when and where they can. This war will not and cannot be the totality of America 's worldwide strategy. It can be only a piece of it. But given the high stakes, it must be prosecuted ruthlessly, effectively, and for as long as the threat persists. This will sometimes require military interventions when, as in Afghanistan, states either cannot or will not deny the terrorists a base. That aspect of the "war on terror" is certainly not going away. One need only contemplate the American popular response should a terrorist group explode a nuclear weapon on American soil. No president of any party or ideological coloration will be able to resist the demands of the American people for retaliation and revenge, and not only against the terrorists but against any nation that aided or harbored them. Nor, one suspects, will the American people disapprove when a president takes preemptive action to forestall such a possibility -- assuming the action is not bungled.

## Hegemony Good – Proliferation

### Hegemony is critical to preventing wildfire proliferation

Rosen, National Security and Military Affairs Professor at Harvard, ‘3 (Stephen, “An Empire, If You Can Keep It” National Interest, Spring)

Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.

## Hegemony Good – Economy

### Hegemony is critical to trade, investment, and continued economic growth

Walt, of the JFK School of Government at Harvard, ‘2 (Stephen, “AMERICAN PRIMACY: Its Prospects and Pitfalls,” Naval War College Review, Spring, Volume LV, Number 2)

By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy, American primacy also fosters global prosperity. Economic interdependence is often said to be a cause of world peace, but it is more accurate to say that peace encourages interdependence-by making it easier for states to accept the potential vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse. Investors are more willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states worry less about being dependent on others when they are not concerned that these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will also be less fixated on how the gains from cooperation are distributed. In particular, they are less likely to worry that extensive cooperation will benefit others more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time. By providing a tranquil international environment, in short, U.S. primacy has created political conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and investment. Indeed, American primacy was a prerequisite for the creation and gradual expansion of the European Union, which is often touted as a triumph of economic self-interest over historical rivalries. Because the United States was there to protect the Europeans from the Soviet Union and from each other, they could safely ignore the balance of power within Western Europe and concentrate on expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of world trade has been a major source of increased global prosperity, and U.S. primacy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests. The United States also played a leading role in establishing the various institutions that regulate and manage the world economy. As a number of commentators have noted, the current era of “globalization” is itself partly an artifact of American power. As Thomas Friedman puts it, “Without America on duty, there will be no America Online.”

## Hegemony Good – Global Warming

### Hegemony collapse leads to global warming

Cascio 2/4/08 (Jamais, fellow @ the Institute for ethics and emerging technologies, pg. http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/cascio20080204/)

The relationship between climate chaos and the rise of the post-hegemonic world is tricky. Climate disruption isn’t causing the decline of US hegemony, nor is it caused by that decline. However, global warming underscores the weakness of the American hegemony, and that the decline of American hegemony weakens the potential for a near-term coordinated response to global warming. Moreover, this decline has the potential to make dealing with climate chaos more difficult. The best example of this situation occurred at the Bali global warming conference in December. The US delegation refused to sign an agreement accepted by essentially the rest of the participants, instead arguing for its own alternative. Kevin Conrad, the delegate from Papua New Guinea, then stepped to the microphone and [said this](http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/cascio20080204/www.cnn.com/2007/LIVING/studentnews/12/16/transcript.mon/index.html): There’s an old saying: If you are not willing to lead, then get out of the way. I ask the United States: We asked for your leadership; we seek your leadership. But if for some reason you are not willing to lead, leave it to the rest of us; please get out of the way. A weakened American hegemon is one that is most likely to either try a costly attempt to shore up its power, or lash out at rising competitors, distracting national and world leadership at a time when distraction is most problematic. Of all of the risks to our global capacity to deal with global warming, this is the most dangerous.

## Hegemony Good – China

### U.S. force presence prevents a Chinese invasion of Taiwan

Nicsch, Asian Affairs Specialist for the Congressional Research Service, 5-25-‘0 (Larry, Washington Times)

The limitations of the debate will not be altered so long as it pays no attention to the issue of the adequacy of the U.S. force structure in the Western Pacific to influence the situation in the Taiwan Strait. No future decisions on arms sales to Taiwan will replace two fundamental roles that only U.S. forces in the Western Pacific can play. Only U.S. forces would have the capabilities to respond immediately to a Chinese attack by striking at bases and missiles launch sites that would be the sources of the attack, thus limiting the damage to Taiwan. Equally, and perhaps most important, only U.S. forces would constitute an effective deterrence against a Chinese decision to use military force. If China continues to escalate its threats and military buildup, Beijing will examine closely the indicators of U.S. intent and military capabilities. Chinese analysts and policy-makers increasingly will link U.S. intent with U.S. military capabilities in the region, especially if, as expected, the United States continues its policy of maintaining ambiguity regarding its commitment to Taiwan's defense.

## Hegemony Sustainable 1/2

### Declinism is exaggerated – the US will remain the sole superpower – domestic problems aren’t a threat, demographics hurt rivals, and no country can match us

Brooks and Wohlforth, Gov Profs at Dartmouth, ‘9 (Stephen and William, “Reshaping the World Order: How Washington Should Reform International Institutes”http://www.polisci.ufl.edu/usfpinstitute/2010/documents/readings/Brooks%20and%20Wohlforth.doc)

Only a few years ago, pundits were absorbed in debates about American "empire." Now, the conventional wisdom is that the world is rapidly approaching the end of the unipolar system with the United States as the sole superpower. A dispassionate look at the facts shows that this view understates U.S. power as much as recent talk of empire exaggerated it. That the United States weighs more on the traditional scales of world power than has any other state in modern history is as true now as it was when the commentator Charles Krauthammer proclaimed the advent of a "unipolar moment" in these pages nearly two decades ago. The United States continues to account for about half the world's defense spending and one-quarter of its economic output. Some of the reasons for bearishness concern public policy problems that can be fixed (expensive health care in the United States, for example), whereas many of the reasons for bullishness are more fundamental (such as the greater demographic challenges faced by the United States' potential rivals). So why has opinion shifted so quickly from visions of empire to gloomy declinism? One reason is that the United States' successes at the turn of the century led to irrational exuberance, thereby setting unreasonably high standards for measuring the superpower's performance. From 1999 to 2003, seemingly easy U.S. victories in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq led some to conclude that the United States could do what no great power in history had managed before: effortlessly defeat its adversaries. It was only a matter of time before such pie-in-the-sky benchmarks proved unattainable. Subsequent difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq dashed illusions of omnipotence, but these upsets hardly displaced the United States as the world's leading state, and there is no reason to believe that the militaries of its putative rivals would have performed any better. The United States did not cease to be a superpower when its polities in Cuba and Vietnam failed in the 1960s; bipolarity lived on for three decades. Likewise, the United States remains the sole superpower today. Another key reason for the multipolar mania is "the rise of the rest." Impressed by the rapid economic growth of China and India, many write as if multipolarity has already returned. But such pronouncements mistake current trajectories for final outcomes a common strategic error with deep psychological roots. The greatest concern in the Cold War, for example, came not from the Soviet Union's actually attaining parity with the United States but from the expectation that it would do so in the future, Veterans of that era recall how the launch of Sputnik in 1957 fed the perception that Soviet power was growing rapidly, leading some policymakers and analysts to start acting as if the Soviet Union were already as powerful as the United States. A state that is rising should not be confused with one that has risen, just as a state that is declining should not be written off as having already declined. China is generally seen as the country best positioned to emerge as a superpower challenger to the United States. Yet depending on how one measures GDP, Chinas economy is between 20 percent and 43 percent the size of the United States'. More dramatic is the difference in GDP per capita, for which all measures show Chinas as being less than 10 percent of the United States'. Absent a 1930s-style depression that spares potential U.S. rivals, the United States will not be replaced as the sole superpower for a very long time. Real multipolarity--an international system of three or more evenly matched powers--is nowhere on the horizon. Relative power between states shifts slowly. This tendency to conflate trends with outcomes is often driven by the examination in isolation of certain components of state power. If the habit during the Cold War was to focus on military power, the recent trend has been to single out economic output. No declinist tract is complete without a passage noting that although the United States may remain a military superpower, economic multipolarity is, or soon will be, the order of the day. Much as highlighting the Soviet Union's military power meant overlooking the country's economic and technological feet of clay, examining only economic output means putting on blinders. In 1991, Japan's economy was two-thirds the size of the United States', which, according to the current popular metric, would mean that with the Soviet Union's demise, the world shifted from bipolarity to, well, bipolarity. Such a partial assessment of power will produce no more accurate an analysis today. Nor will giving in to apprehension about the growing importance of nonstate actors. The National Intelligence Council's report Global Trends 2025 grabbed headlines by forecasting the coming multipolarity, anticipating a power shift as much to nonstate actors as to fast-growing countries. But nonstate actors are nothing new--compare the scale and scope of today's pirates off the Somali coast with those of their eighteenth-century predecessors or the political power of today's multinational corporations with that of such behemoths as the British East India Company--and projections of their rise may well be as much hype as reflections of reality. And even if the power of nonstate actors is rising, this should only increase the incentives for interstate cooperation; nonstate threats do not affect just the United States. Most nonstate actors' behavior, moreover, still revolves around influencing the decisions of states. Nongovernmental organizations typically focus on trying to get states to change their policies, and the same is true of most terrorists. When it comes to making, managing, and remaking international institutions, states remain the most important actors and the United States is the most important of them. No other country will match the United States' combination of wealth, size, technological capacity, and productivity in the foreseeable future. The world is and will long remain a 1 + x world, with one superpower and x number of major powers. A shift from 1 + 3 to 1 + 4 or 5 or 6 would have many important consequences, but it would not change the fact that the United States will long be in a far stronger position to lead the world than any other state.

Hegemony Sustainable 2/2

### United States Hegemony irreplaceable and sustainable.

Joffe 09 Josef, Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, ("The Default Power Subtitle: The False Prophecy of America's Decline", Foreign Affairs, Oct 2009)

The default power does what others cannot or will not do. It underwrites Europe's security against a resurgent Russia -- which is why U.S. troops remain welcome there even 20 years after Moscow's capitulation in the Cold War. It helps the Europeans take care of local malefactors, such as former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. It chastises whoever reaches for mastery over the Middle East, thus the United States helped Iraq in its war against Iran between 1980 and 1988 and then defanged it in 1991 and again in 2003. Only the default power has the power to harness a coalition against Iran, the new pretender in the Middle East. It guarantees the survival of Israel, but at the same time, the Palestinians and the Saudis look to the United States for leverage against Jerusalem. Is it possible to imagine China, Europe, or Russia as a more persuasive mediator? No, because only the United States can insure both the Arabs and the Israelis against the consequences of misplaced credulity. In the new Great Game, the United States offers itself as a silent partner against Russian attempts to restore sway over its former satrapies, and it leads the renewed battle against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, signaling ever so softly that it will sequester Pakistan's nuclear weapons if chaos widens into collapse. At the same time, only the United States can rein in both India and Pakistan and protect each against the other. The United States has drawn India into its orbit, and in doing so it has added to the informal balance against China. Dreams of Asia Rising must pay respect to a strategic reality centered on the United States as the underwriter of regional security. Whether Vietnam or Japan, South Korea or Australia -- all of Asia counts on the United States to keep China on its best behavior and Japan from going nuclear. Gainsayers will still dramatize China's growth rates as a harbinger of a grand power shift. The facts and figures and the story of the resistible rise of previous contenders should give pause to those who either cheer or fear the United States' abdication. Linearity is not a good predictor. Imperial powers have regularly succumbed to the ebb and flow of power, although in the United Kingdom's case, that took 300 years. How long will the United States' luck last? Addicted to constant reinvention, it should not fall prey to the rigor mortis that overwhelmed the Ottoman, Austrian, Russian, and Soviet empires. As the twenty-first century unfolds, the United States will be younger and more dynamic than its competitors. And as a liberal empire, it can work the international system with fewer costs than yesterday's behemoths, which depended on territorial possessions and had to conduct endless wars against natives and rivals. A Tyrannosaurus rex faces costlier resistance than the bumbling bull that is the United States. A final point to ponder: Who would actually want to live in a world dominated by China, India, Japan, Russia, or even Europe, which for all its enormous appeal cannot take care of its own backyard? Not even those who have been trading in glee and gloom decade after decade would prefer any of them to take over as housekeeper of the world.

## 2AC Transition Wars

### Relative economic collapse spurs a rapid and disorderly decline of hegemony – It’s only manageable if we have a stable economy

Scher, Fitch Ratings and Duff and Phelps, ’10 (Roger- former US Foreign Service Officer and Federal Reserve Analyst, January 12, “USA could lose its AAA this decade” Foreign Policy Association – Rising Powers, http://risingpowers.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/01/12/usa-could-lose-its-aaa-this-decade/)

Planet Earth’s critical issue this decade will be whether American power will erode — and if so, what the implications will be for the liberal world order we erected after WWII. The Obama administration’s fiscal stimulus package cum bank bailout, building on the Paulson-Bush-Geithner-Bernanke efforts of 2008 and the unprecedented coordination of economic policy globally, constituted a brilliant, stage-managed rescue of our planet, nothing less. However, such a Herculean effort has created its own problems — huge debts, gaping goverment deficits, and a government intrusion in the economy that will be hard to reverse. As yet, no plans to solve these problems have been offered. Students of power and prosperity from Paul Kennedy on down know that imperial overextension accelerates the decline of great powers. From this dynamic, the US is not immune. While the relative decline of the US has been in place since the 1950s, its rapidity and consequences are far from inevitable. A too precipitous, disorderly, angry decline that would occur if America does not right its fiscal ship soon would not only injure American prosperity, but would also put at risk our global institutions — the UN, the IMF and World Bank, NATO, the WTO, the G-20, etc. These institutions have fostered cooperation and peaceful solutions to the world’s problems. The symbolic end to this Pax Americana, which has raised billions out of poverty and offered countless millions broader political participation, could be the loss of the AAA rating on US government bonds. According to Brian Coulton, head of Global Economics at Fitch Ratings, this could occur later this decade if an aggressive fiscal consolidation program is not implemented by the Obama administration (see note below). A narrow tax base, low discretionary spending (the kind of spending that is easiest to cut) and huge entitlements — including the $900 billion health “reform” up on Capitol Hill, the continued current account deficits in spite of sluggish GDP growth, and our dependence on foreigners for financing together spell a potentially rapid decline of America’s place in the world.

### Collapse causes micro-militarist adventures to hold onto waning power – bigger internal link

McCoy, History Prof at Wisconsin-Madison, ’10 (Alfred, December 6, “The Decline and Fall of the American Empire Four Scenarios for the End of the American Century by 2025” TomDispatch, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/12/06-1)

Military Misadventure: Present Situation Counterintuitively, as their power wanes, empires often plunge into ill-advised military misadventures. This phenomenon is known among historians of empire as “micro-militarism” and seems to involve psychologically compensatory efforts to salve the sting of retreat or defeat by occupying new territories, however briefly and catastrophically. These operations, irrational even from an imperial point of view, often yield hemorrhaging expenditures or humiliating defeats that only accelerate the loss of power.Embattled empires through the ages suffer an arrogance that drives them to plunge ever deeper into military misadventures until defeat becomes debacle. In 413 BCE, a weakened Athens sent 200 ships to be slaughtered in Sicily. In 1921, a dying imperial Spain dispatched 20,000 soldiers to be massacred by Berber guerrillas in Morocco. In 1956, a fading British Empire destroyed its prestige by attacking Suez. And in 2001 and 2003, the U.S. occupied Afghanistan and invaded Iraq. With the hubris that marks empires over the millennia, Washington has increased its troops in Afghanistan to 100,000, expanded the war into Pakistan, and extended its commitment to 2014 and beyond, courting disasters large and small in this guerilla-infested, nuclear-armed graveyard of empires.

Military Misadventure: Scenario 2014 So irrational, so unpredictable is “micro-militarism” that seemingly fanciful scenarios are soon outdone by actual events. With the U.S. military stretched thin from Somalia to the Philippines and tensions rising in Israel, Iran, and Korea, possible combinations for a disastrous military crisis abroad are multifold.

## No Multipolarity

### Loss of hegemony doesn’t create stable multipolarity – It generates violent anarchy that escalates to the use of weapons of mass destruction

Brzezinski, Former Secretary of State, 2K4 (Zbigniew, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership)

In any case, the eventual end of American hegemony will not involve a restoration of multipolarity among the familiar major pow­ers that dominated world affairs for the last two centuries. Nor will it yield to another dominant hegemon that would displace the United States by assuming a similar political, military, economic, technologi­cal, and sociocultural worldwide preeminence. The familiar powers of the last century are too fatigued or too weak to assume the role the United States now plays. It is noteworthy that since 1880, in a com­parative ranking of world powers (cumulatively based on their eco­nomic strength, military budgets and assets, populations, etc.), the top five slots at sequential twenty-year intervals have been shared by just seven states: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and China. Only the United States, however, unambigu­ously earned inclusion among the top five in every one of the twenty- year intervals, and the gap in the year 2000 between the top-ranked United States and the rest was vastly wider than ever before, The former major European powers—Great Britain, Germany, and France—are too weak to step into the breach. In the next two decades, it is quite unlikely that the European Union will become suf­ficiently united politically to muster the popular will to compete with the United States in the politico-military arena, Russia is no longer an imperial power, and its central challenge is to recover socioeconomi­cally lest it lose its far eastern territories to China. Japan’s population is aging and its economy has slowed; the conventional wisdom of the 1980s that Japan is destined to be the next “superstate” now has the ring of historical irony. China, even if it succeeds in maintaining high rates of economic growth and retains its internal political stability both are far from certain), will at best be a regional power still con­strained by an impoverished population, antiquated infrastructure, and limited appeal worldwide. The same is true of India, which addition­ally faces uncertainties regarding its long-term national unity. Even a coalition among the above—a most unlikely prospect, given their historical conflicts and clashing territorial claims—would lack the cohesion, muscle, and energy needed to both push America off its pedestal and sustain global stability. Some leading states, in any case, would side with America if push came to shove, Indeed, any evident American decline might precipitate efforts to reinforce America’sleadership. Most important, the shared resentment of American hege­mony would not dampen the clashes of interest among states. The more intense collisions—in the event of America’s decline—could spark a wildfire of regional violence, rendered all the more dangerous by the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction. [P. 2-4]

## No Counterbalancing – General 1/3

### No other countries can replace the United States

Joffe 09 Josef, Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, ("The Default Power Subtitle: The False Prophecy of America's Decline", Foreign Affairs, Oct 2009)

LAST MAN STANDING Compound-interest games are entertaining but not enlightening, since power, the most elusive concept in political science, is not just a matter of growth rates. What, then, makes a country great? A large population, a large economy, and a large military are necessary but not sufficient conditions. What puts the United States in a league of its own? For one, the world's most sophisticated military panoply, fed by a defense budget that dwarfs all comers and gives the United States the means to intervene anywhere on the planet. But there is even more: an unmatched research and higher-education establishment that continues to drive excellence. All projections that show China surpassing the United States in the first half of this century leave out these two unspectacular -- but critical -- sources of power. Of the world's top 20 universities, all but three are American; of the top 50, all but 11 are located in the United States. By contrast, India's two best universities are tucked away in the world's 300-to-400 tier. China does a bit better, its top three -- Nanjing University, Peking University, and Shanghai University -- are in the 200-to-300 group of the world's 500 best. Harvard and Stanford are not quaking, and neither are Cambridge and Oxford. China's public spending on education, meanwhile, has been in the range of 2.0-2.5 percent of GDP over the last quarter century -- this for a population four times as large as the United States' and an economy four times as small. In the United States, average spending has been close to six percent, higher than that of India, Japan, Russia, and the EU. The same pattern holds for research and development (R & D) outlays, with the U.S. rate almost twice as high as China's -- again as a fraction of a vastly larger GDP. Education and R & D are critical because they condition future performance. True, an increasing number of U.S. graduates in the hard sciences are foreign born or first- generation immigrants. But far from betraying a failure on the United States' part, this trend actually dramatizes a unique advantage: no other country draws so many of the world's best and brightest to its labs and universities, especially from China and India. Another aspect of national power is a warrior culture. The United States still has one, as does the United Kingdom. But Europe -- although it bests or equals the United States in terms of population, economic size, and military might -- no longer has the mindset that once made it the master of the world. The armies of European countries are no longer objects of national pride and no longer serve as ladders for social advancement, nor are they the principal agents for promoting the national interest. For all its marvelous riches, Europe is hardly a prime player in the contemporary great-power game: it does not think like a global power, nor can it move with the speed or decisiveness of a real state. The EU takes pride in being a civilian power that expands by force of example, rather than by force of arms. And why not, as long as the United States acts as the security lender of last resort? What distinguishes the United States from the rest is its choice of role and mission in the world. This self-definition is best illuminated by a comparison with Russia, which wants back what it lost, and China, which wants more than it has. Both countries want more, but for themselves, not for all. Driven by selfish purposes, powers such as Russia and China cannot be what the United States was at its best in the twentieth century: a state that pursued its own interests by also serving those of others and thus created global demand for the benefits it provided. It is neither altruism nor egotism but enlightened self-interest that breeds influence.

No Counterbalancing – General 2/3

### No backlash against leadership

Lieber, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University, ‘8 (Robert, Summer, “Falling Upwards: Declinism” World Affairs Journal)

What is new in the new declinism? A typical variation stipulates that slow- motion shifts in the distribution of global power make it impossible for this country to continue to play the dominating role it has since the end of the Cold War. Yet we have heard this argument, made most recently in Foreign Affairs by Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass, many times before. As far back as 1972, President Richard Nixon depicted an emerging balance among five major powers: the U.S., Russia, China, Europe, and Japan. In recent years, some commentators have detected an analogous dilution of U.S. influence in the rise of the “BRICs” (Brazil, Russia, India, China), coupled with an expanded and increasingly unified European Union and a flourishing East Asia. In this telling, not only has global power become more widely diffused, but other powers have started to “balance” against the United States, seeking to minimize Washington’s role and thwart its global ambitions. The new declinists usually pin the blame (or credit) on the Bush administration’s grand strategy (the Bush Doctrine)—a crudely unilateralist assertion of American power that disregards both the views of other countries and international law. This conduct is said to have provoked a global backlash against the United States, evidenced both in rising anti-Americanism and in the “balancing” policies of many foreign governments. In his New York Times article, Khanna rehearses the orthodoxy: “America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order.” Declinists cannot help but acknowledge that the U.S. still possesses the world’s most formidable military power, but they view America’s armed forces as gravely over-extended and trapped in a costly misadventure. The immediate problem is the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq without formal UN authorization; beyond that there are doubts about America’s moral credibility in projecting force anywhere at all. The declinists also see the U.S. reeling economically. A massive inflow of manufactured goods from East Asia coupled with huge trade and payment deficits has severely weakened the dollar and created an enormous buildup of financial reserves in countries like China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. This, in turn, raises the possibility of a crippling financial crisis were these countries suddenly to unload their U.S. Treasury securities. Making matters worse, a spike in world oil prices has accelerated financial outflows and piled up dollar reserves in the OPEC countries and in Russia. Foreign sovereign wealth funds have used these funds to acquire American assets at basement prices and, with them, the capacity to wield economic and political leverage against Washington. The run- up in oil prices has also boosted the fortunes of hostile regimes, including those of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. With impressive detail and more than a hint of condescension, the new declinists mine this data to make the case for an America in jeopardy—watching helplessly as its global power crumbles away. The solution: a more “realistic” America that lowers its sights and shifts course at home and abroad in line with the new realities. In a time of war, televised terror threats, and economic and political pessimism, declinism has some of the qualities of a universal solvent: it explains everything. But while it may harmonize with current tremors of fear and uncertainty, declinism succeeds less well as a “new paradigm.” In contrast to the declinists’ arguments and analyses, America boasts a position of unmatched preponderance. No single country or even grouping of countries has emerged as a plausible counterpart or peer competitor, and apart from the very long-term possibility of China, none is likely to do so.

No Counterbalancing – General 3/3

### The United States absolute power cannot be replaced by any other countries

Joffe 09 Josef, Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, ("The Default Power Subtitle: The False Prophecy of America's Decline", Foreign Affairs, Oct 2009)

The United States' choice of its role, in addition to its vast material riches, made it the twentieth century's indispensable nation. While acting on its own interests, it twice saved Europe from itself, and then saved it a third time, during the Cold War, from the Soviet Union. In the interwar period -- again, obeying its own economic interests – the United States sought to blunt what John Maynard Keynes called "the economic consequences of the peace" by pumping dollars into Europe's economies. Although the Dawes and Young Plans, two U.S.-led economic assistance programs after World War I, were surely designed to make Europe safe and profitable for U.S. investments and exports, they also promoted recovery in Europe, as the Marshall Plan did a generation later. Much has been said about the splendid institutional architecture the United States put in place after World War II, from the United Nations to NATO, and from the International Monetary Fund to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. But the point needs repeating: to find profit for itself, the United States provided for others. But all this occurred during times of war, hot or cold, when hard necessity generated the incentive to shoulder the burden and pay the price. What makes the United States indispensable now? The United States is the default power, the country that occupies center stage because there is nobody else with the requisite power and purpose. Why not any of the others? On a speculative note, it may take a liberal, seafaring empire to turn national interests into international public goods. The United Kingdom built a global empire for itself, but in the process it produced a whole slew of precious public goods: free trade, freedom of the seas, and the gold standard. It is difficult to imagine China, India, Japan, Russia, or the EU as guardians of the larger common interest. The EU comes close, but it has neither the means nor the will to act strategically. Japan, although rich enough to marshal the means, will continue to huddle under the United States' strategic umbrella as long as it is extended. India has the size and the population, but apart from being the poorest of them all, it is trapped in a permanent conflict with Pakistan (and a latent one with China), which monopolizes its resources and attention. China and Russia are revisionist powers in business only for themselves. They also lack the right polity. The United Kingdom and the United States are history's only liberal empires. To labor for a liberal order abroad requires such an order at home, and so does the habit, sincere or selfish, of articulating the national interest in a universal language. The British Empire's rule over India was more benign than Belgium's over the Congo under the rapacious reign of King Leopold, and it was also more pleasant than is China's in Tibet or Russia's in its former Soviet empire. The United States has routinely intervened in Central America -- where it once kept a lot of nasty company -- but China's rebellious students put up a replica of the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square, and not one of Lenin's mausoleum. China and Russia might shine forth as models of authoritarian modernization, but to capture a wider swath of the political imagination, it takes a country that is not just rich but also democratic and free.

## No Counterbalancing – China

### China cannot surpass the United States economically, means they can’t surpass as the global hegemon

Joffe 09 Josef, Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, ("The Default Power Subtitle: The False Prophecy of America's Decline", Foreign Affairs, Oct 2009)

The breathtaking rise of China is at the center of the current spate of declinism, much as Japan's was in the 1980s. This argument is not about the present or the absolute decline of the United States but about its relative loss vis-à-vis China -- the United States is supposedly doomed because China's economy has been growing at three times the rate of the United States' and therefore will surpass the United States in terms of output sometime in the next several decades. This would be a safe bet only if GDP is measured using purchasing power parity (PPP), which raises China's 2007 nominal GDP from $3.3 trillion to almost $8 trillion because of its extremely depressed price and wage levels. Taking a high-end estimate of Chinese growth -- an annual rate of ten percent -- China's economy would double every seven years, overtaking current U.S. GDP as early as 2015 and leaving the United States in the dust seven years later. But whatever the tipping point, this calculation suggests that China will emerge as number one. Alas, global standing is not measured by the low prices of nontradable goods, such as haircuts, bootlegged software, and government services. Think instead about advanced technology, energy, raw materials, and the cost of higher education in the West. These items are critical for growth and must be procured on the world market. Influence bought abroad, say, through foreign aid, also comes at exchange-rate prices, as does imported high-tech weaponry. The debate over whether to consider GDP based on PPP or nominal GDP as a measure of economic power is endless. The Australian economist Saul Eslake, who predicts the déclassement of the United States on the basis of PPP as early as 2015, offers a typical caveat: "Of course, these projections may prove inaccurate: by and large they extrapolate the growth rates of the recent past, and make no allowance for a global economic downturn, or for downturns in any individual economy, and they do not seem to make much allowance for demographic factors." Life, however, is not linear. China's uninterrupted double-digit growth rates are of a recent vintage, essentially since 2003. In 1989 and 1990, growth in China was four percent. In 1967 and 1968, China's growth actually fell, by 5.1 percent and 2.9 percent, respectively, and in 1976, it fell by 5.8 percent. These last three years are not plucked at random; the first two marked the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, and the last one, its end, and they offer a useful reminder of volatility driven by wrenching domestic upheaval. History sounded a similar warning against straight-line projections in 1989, the year of the crackdown in Tiananmen Square, when growth plummeted to four percent, compared with 11.3 percent the previous year. Karl Marx asserted that economics drives everything else -- such turmoil suggests that politics is mightier stillEstimates that China's economy will grow by six percent in 2009 are another cautionary tale. China's growth has dropped by half from a historical high of almost 12 percent in 2007, which serves as a warning that its miraculous growth is foreign made -- China is a place where the rest of the world essentially rents workers and workspace at deflated prices and distorted exchange rates. The Chinese economy is extremely dependent on exports -- they amount to around two-fifths of China's GDP -- and hence vulnerable to global economic downturns. In fact, China's exports have plunged by 26 percent this year. Such are the cyclical risks of playing offshore manufacturing heaven to the world. Export-led expansion may pick up in China again if world trade returns to earlier levels. But such a recovery would not solve the underlying problem: the structural deformation export dependency has wrought. Between 1991 and 1995, 100 million yuan in investment in fixed assets yielded 66.2 million yuan in GDP and 400 new jobs, according to Minxin Pei of the Carnegie Endowment. But ten years later, according to Pei's data, the same amount of investment added only 28.6 million yuan to GDP and 170 new jobs. The law of diminishing returns -- the oldest in economics -- has begun to bite. This also has political consequences, which are never factored into linear forecasts based on past performance. Precisely because China is so export dependent, it devotes only 35 percent of GDP to private consumption, compared with 60 percent in many Western countries. Something will have to give, as some 70,000 civil disturbances each year in China suggest, the latest being the turmoil in Xinjiang in July 2009 that killed hundreds. If China does shift resources into social services and support, exports and export-led growth will necessarily fall. Germany is an instructive case: it has about the same export ratio as China, but it also supports a welfare state that eats up one-third of its GDP, which has resulted in an average annual growth rate of 1.5 percent over the last decade. The Chinese regime thus faces the predicament of choosing between exports and welfare. Authoritarian modernization à la Deng Xiaoping has managed to suppress this clash, but unless China is not of this world, society's chickens will come home to roost, demanding to be fed or freed. Even if China manages to avoid the pernicious dynamics of authoritarian modernization -- war, revolution, and upheaval -- that eventually befell imperial Germany, Japan, and Russia, it will face another challenge in its demographic deterioration. Essentially, China will grow old before becoming rich, as Mark Haas, a professor of political science at Duquesne University, has noted. According to Goldman Sachs, by 2050 the Chinese economy will long have overtaken the U.S. economy, with a GDP of $45 trillion compared with the United States' $35 trillion. But by then, the median age in the United States will be the lowest of any of the world's large powers, except India. The United States' working-age population will have grown by about 30 percent, whereas China's will have dropped by three percent. The economic and strategic consequences will be enormous. China's aging population will require a shifting of resources from investment to welfare, thus reducing China's growth. And as the economic pie shrinks, a growing number of pensioners -- 329 million by 2050 -- will demand a larger slice. This will necessarily cut into the share for the People's Liberation Army. If China cannot dodge this double whammy, how can it be expected to unseat the United States as the greatest military power the world has ever seen? Perhaps it is time to play a different round of the compound-interest game so beloved by the declinists. Assuming China's economy grows at seven percent -- twice the historical rate of the United States' -- China's GDP will double between 2007 and 2015, from $3.3 trillion to $6.6 trillion, and then double again by 2025, to $13.2 trillion. By that time, assuming 3.5 percent annual growth for the United States (the historical average), U.S. GDP will have grown to $28 trillion. Given the myriad challenges China faces, this scenario is more realistic than projections based on China's recent growth rates. China, it seems, still has a way to go before it can dethrone the United States.

## No Offshore Balancing

### US won’t transition to offshore balancing – even if hegemony is unsustainable the US will demand an assertive role – absent the ability to back up our rhetoric war ensues

Schmitt, AEI, ‘7 (Gary, “To Be, or Not to Be…An Empire” National Security Outlook)

Thayer opens the book with his case for American primacy, arguing that America is indeed an empire, but not a traditional one: its influence is now mostly tied to the indirect sway and security provided by its military power, its economic muscle, and the soft power associated with its political ideals and dominant global cultural presence. Moreover, the spirit behind America's empire is the "spirit of 1776." From the get-go, Americans wanted to expand geographically, and--equally important--they saw their notions of political and economic freedom as "a light to the nations." In its bones, America has never been a status quo power. That Thayer and Layne both admit the United States is not an empire in the traditional sense seems to suggest that the country is not, in fact, an empire. But even if America has a hegemonic instinct, Thayer reasonably asks whether the country can carry it out. Can the United States retain its primacy, or will other powers, as most realists believe, react to such overwhelming power by challenging it? Of the available candidates for doing so--China, Europe, and radical Islam--only China presents a significant problem, according to Thayer. Europe is dying away; terrorism is a bloody but manageable nuisance. Thayer even doubts China's long-term prospects, given its own internal problems related to its demographics, corruption, fragile financial system, income inequality, environmental pollution, and so on. Even if the United States can maintain global hegemony, should it? Absent another realistic alternative to keep peace and stability in the world, Thayer argues, it remains in America's interest to play the role of hegemon. It might not make us loved, but the general stability provided by the American security umbrella of alliances and military power has made the world much more peaceful than it would otherwise be. By standards both economic and humane, Thayer says, that is a good return on the U.S. investment. Layne's argument is that there is, in fact, a realist alternative to the endless pursuit of primacy: a strategy of "offshore balancing" that amounts to a quasi-isolationist policy of selective diplomatic and military engagement. Indeed, the "offensive" realist argument for primacy rests, Layne suggests, on paying too much attention to the lessons supposedly learned from the security problems and strategies for dealing with them that arose from centuries of competition among the powers of continental Europe. Given America's geography and weak neighbors, the security model far more relevant to our situation is the one adopted by maritime Britain: a small army, a big fleet, and a willingness to find new allies quickly and dump old ones when necessary. Today's primacy advocates couple it with a policy of democracy promotion, believing that the world is safer when there are more democracies, not fewer--a thesis Layne calls the most "over-hyped and under-supported 'theory' ever to be concocted by American academics."[3] According to Layne, the advantage of his alternative grand strategy is that it avoids stimulating great power rivalries, eliminates the economically disastrous consequences of "imperial overstretch," and precludes the necessity of a "national security state" in which our rights and civic culture are put at risk. Finally, it avoids the messes of democracy promotion and nation-building (e.g., Somalia and Iraq). Problems and Prospects International security specialists will quibble that Thayer's and Layne's two grand strategies are not the sum total of strategies available to the "American empire." Nor will they be satisfied with the authors' loose use of the term "empire." That Thayer and Layne both admit the United States is not an empire in the traditional sense seems to suggest that the country is not, in fact, an empire. Hegemony and empire are not one and the same, although their attributes can at times overlap. That said, the book provides plenty of fodder for debate and thought. Its biggest problem, however, lies in Layne's dyspeptic analysis of current policy opponents. Rather than taking the opposing argument as seriously as Thayer takes his, Layne resorts to unsubstantiated claims about "neocons," White House lies, and cabals (the "Blue Team") trying to foment a "preventive" war with China.[4] Similarly, his dismissal of the democratic peace theory is equally over-the-top. Even if one thinks that the theory is at times oversold, to claim that it has absolutely no merit leaves readers with the sense that there is as much anger as argument in Layne's case. An additional problem, perhaps tied to the way the book is structured, is that Layne spends the majority of his time criticizing the argument for primacy without giving the reader much of a handle on the particulars of his own preferred strategy. As a result, we do not know whether his model of "offshore balancing" is more British in style--that is, fairly active in playing the decisive power broker among the other competing states--or more passive in content, such as the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. If the former, a key problem with the strategy is that it requires a far more calculating style of statecraft than the United States has ever had. And even if we had Henry Kissinger upon Henry Kissinger to carry it out, would the American people really let their government play this particular game of international politics, shifting partners based on power relations rather than on the character of the states themselves? The disappearance of the United States as a security guarantor is likely to lead to more competition among states and to the creation of a more chaotic and fluid international environment. Britain had a hard enough time playing this role in its day, finding itself in numerous conflicts regardless. If the latter, the passive offshore balancing approach leads to the question of whether such a strategy results in putting off a security challenge until it may be far more difficult to deal with. Layne's bet, at least in the case of Iran and China today, is that if the United States would only get out of the way, other powers would naturally begin to meet the challenge. It is possible, but doing so might create even more destabilizing competition among other regional powers or lead those same powers to acquiesce to China or Iran's new hegemony, fueling their ambitions rather than lessening them. The history of international relations suggests that most great crises result from neglecting to address more minor ones early on. As Thayer argues, it is probably less costly to nip these threats in the bud to than wait for them to become full-blown security crises.

## Offshore Balancing Bad 1/3

### An offshore balancing strategy leads on multiple scenarios of terrorism and conflicts around the world, withdrawals will not substantially reduce defense spending.

Kagan 1/24/2011 (Robert Kagan is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, The Price of Power

The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?nopager=1)

Today the international situation is also one of high risk.  • The terrorists who would like to kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase the chances they will succeed. • American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons. • In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too, nations in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have to decide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear weapons to resist it. In the 1990s, after the Soviet Union had collapsed and the biggest problem in the world seemed to be ethnic conflict in the Balkans, it was at least plausible to talk about cutting back on American military capabilities. In the present, increasingly dangerous international environment, in which terrorism and great power rivalry vie as the greatest threat to American security and interests, cutting military capacities is simply reckless. Would we increase the risk of strategic failure in an already risky world, despite the near irrelevance of the defense budget to American fiscal health, just so we could tell American voters that their military had suffered its “fair share” of the pain? The nature of the risk becomes plain when one considers the nature of the cuts that would have to be made to have even a marginal effect on the U.S. fiscal crisis. Many are under the illusion, for instance, that if the United States simply withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and didn’t intervene anywhere else for a while, this would have a significant impact on future deficits. But, in fact, projections of future massive deficits already assume the winding down of these interventions. Withdrawal from the two wars would scarcely make a dent in the fiscal crisis. Nor can meaningful reductions be achieved by cutting back on waste at the Pentagon—which Secretary of Defense Gates has already begun to do and which has also been factored into deficit projections. If the United States withdrew from Iran and Afghanistan tomorrow, cut all the waste Gates can find, and even eliminated a few weapons programs—all this together would still not produce a 10 percent decrease in overall defense spending.

Offshore Balancing Bad 2/3

### Smaller militaries will not stop the US from intervening.

Kagan 1/24/2011 (Robert Kagan is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, The Price of Power

The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?nopager=1)

Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate? American unipolarity is unprecedented.324 First, the United States is geographically isolated from other potential rivals, who are located near one

### Offshore balancing fails – We will get sucked into power wars – Only extended deterrence prevents conflicts before they start

Kagan, Hillhouse Professor of History at Yale, ‘0 (Robert, “National Interest and Global Responsibility,” Present Dangers: Crisis & Opportunity in American Foreign & Defense Policy, ed. Kagan & Kristol)

In fact, a strategy aimed at preserving American pre-eminence would require an even greater U.S. commitment to its allies. The United States would not be merely an “offshore balancer,” a sav­ior of last resort, as many recommend. It would not be a “reluc­tant sheriff,” rousing itself to action only when the threatened townsfolk turn to it in desperation. American pre-eminence can­not be maintained from a distance, by means of some post—Cold War version of the Nixon doctrine, whereby the United States hangs back and keeps its powder dry. The United States would instead conceive of itself as at once a European power, an Asian power, a Middle Eastern power and, of course, a Western Hemispheric power. It would act as if threats to the interests of our allies are threats to us, which indeed they are. It would act as if instability in important regions of the world, and the flouting of civilized rules of conduct in those regions, are threats that affect us with almost the same immediacy as if they were occurring on our doorstep. To act otherwise would make the United States appear a most unre­liable partner in world affairs, which would erode both American pre-eminence and the international order, and gradually under­mine the very alliances on which U.S. security depends. Eventu­ally, the crises would appear at our doorstep. This is what it means to be a global superpower with global responsibilities. The costs of assuming these responsibilities are more than made up by the benefits to American long-term inter­ests. It is short-sighted to imagine that a policy of “keeping our powder dry” is either safer or less expensive than a policy that aims to preclude and deter the emergence of new threats, that has the United States arriving quickly at the scene of potential trouble before it has fully erupted, that addresses threats to the national interest before they have developed into full-blown crises. Sena­tor Kay Bailey Hutchison expressed a common but mistaken view last year when she wrote that “a superpower is more credible and effective when it maintains a measured distance from all regional conflicts.” In fact, this is precisely the way for a superpower to cease being a superpower. A strong America capable of projecting force quickly and with devastating effect to important regions of the world would make it less likely that challengers to regional stability would attempt to alter the status quo in their favor. It might even deter such chal­lengers from undertaking expensive efforts to arm themselves in the first place. An America whose willingness to project force is in doubt, on the other hand, can only encourage such challenges. In Europe, in Asia and in the Middle East, the message we should be sending to potential foes is: “Don’t even think about it.” That kind of deterrence offers the best recipe for lasting peace; it is much cheaper than fighting the wars that would follow should we fail to build such a deterrent capacity. [P. 15-16]

Offshore Balancing Bad 3/3

### And, Offshore Balancing will lead to Mid-East wars and nuclear conflict

Donnelly, resident fellow in defense and national security studies at the American Enterprise Institute, 6-4-2K7 (Tom, “The Army We Need;We can't fight The Long War with the forces we have”, The Weekly Standard, Vol. 12 No. 36)

We cannot be indifferent to the outcome of this struggle; the world's industrial economies depend upon the region's energy resources, and the region's political troubles embroil the world's great powers, including the rising People's Republic of China. Nor can we confidently retreat to an "offshore" balancing of local potentates. This was supposedly the preferred U.S. posture--now an Excalibur-like ideal for those unhappy with the war in Iraq--but it has been overtaken by events. In the three decades since the creation of U.S. Central Command, our presence in the region has shifted from mostly maritime and transitory to an extended engagement on land. The Arabian heartland--the region centered on Mecca and Medina but including Egypt, the Levant, and Iraq, which al Qaeda theorist Ayman al Zawahiri famously described in his directive to the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi as essential to the jihadists' project--is unquestionably the central front of The Long War. Strategically, al Qaeda in Iraq now matters more than al Qaeda in Waziristan; bin Laden and Zawahiri no longer direct the forces they helped set in motion. And the conflict in Iraq is redefining the jihadists' priorities: They see themselves as engaged in a struggle against the Shiite "apostates" and--according to extremist propaganda--their Iranian Shiite masters. This larger war is being fought with less and less regard for the Iraqis themselves; the Sunni sheikhs in Anbar province and now a collection of "nationalist" insurgent groups want to separate themselves from al Qaeda in Iraq. Nor can there be a neat U.S. disengagement--or "redeployment," to use the term favored by House Democratic leaders--from this central front. Even were the Sunni insurgency defeated, there would remain the need to defend our ally, the government in Baghdad, from external dangers. Not the least of these is Iran, on the road to becoming a nuclear power. But equally, the al Qaeda revolutionaries will not soon give up the struggle. It is their strategy to spark a civil war within Islam, and their core tactic is the practice of terrorism on a global scale. For them not to trigger a nuclear-fueled wild fire, the United States must stay engaged in the region, "onshore," with sizable land forces.

## A2: Layne

### Layne is wrong, the benefits of US hegemony far outweigh the costs. Even then, there’s no alternative to US forward deployment.

Kagan 1/24/2011 (Robert Kagan is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, The Price of Power

The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?nopager=1)

Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly “stabilize” the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan’s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most dreadful wars in human history.  It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build “situations of strength” (Acheson’s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a “preponderance of power,” and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach.  From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman’s containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of “imperial overstretch,” arguing that American decline was inevitable “if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]” were allowed to continue at the same time as “massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.” Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of major war, the support of an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked at coldly, simply in terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs.  The danger, as always, is that we don’t even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible, that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the “end of history.” It is always tempting to believe that the international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power, or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table and the table will not fall over.

## A2: Haas

### Haass is wrong, any war is a “war of choice”. The American public is in favor of the many wars and interventions around the years.

Kagan 1/24/2011 (Robert Kagan is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, The Price of Power

The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?nopager=1)

Thanks to Haass’s clever formulation, there has been a great deal of talk lately about “wars of choice” as opposed to “wars of necessity.” Haass labels both the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan “wars of choice.” Today, many ask whether the United States can simply avoid such allegedly optional interventions in the future, as well as the occupations and exercises in “nation-building” that often seem to follow. Although the idea of eliminating “wars of choice” appears sensible, the historical record suggests it will not be as simple as many think. The problem is, almost every war or intervention the United States has engaged in throughout its history has been optional—and not just the Bosnias, Haitis, Somalias, or Vietnams, but the Korean War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and even World War II (at least the war in Europe), not to mention the many armed interventions throughout Latin America and the Caribbean over the course of the past century, from Cuba in 1898 to Panama in 1989. A case can be made, and has been made by serious historians, that every one of these wars and interventions was avoidable and unnecessary. To note that our most recent wars have also been wars of choice, therefore, is not as useful as it seems. In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again.